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1 Introduction
One of the principal sparks of the Egyptian
revolution was the lack of respect for human
rights, embodied by the killing of Khaled Said at
the hands of police before the revolution. This
raises questions about the extent of human rights
organisations’ contributions to the revolution.
What role did they play in making it happen? To
what extent did the strategies of the Egyptian
human rights movement speak to the dynamics of
social and political change? Another question
concerns the generation gap within the human
rights movement, a result of the lack of internal
rotation of power. Are young people now taking
their proper position within the movement,
especially in light of the valorisation of the
youth’s role in the January 25th revolution?
There are two responses to the above question.
The first is the simpler response: although many
human rights activists and advocacy groups
expected a greater political gridlock, more
premeditated attacks on the press and media,
the closure of newspapers, and the referral of
journalists to trial, and even expected that in the
end these conditions would lead to an explosion,
no one expected a revolution of this size and the
perseverance of young people to make it succeed.
The goal of the human rights movement is not
fundamentally revolutionary; rather it aspires
and plans for incremental, gradual changes with
the goal of promoting human rights principles
and norms.1 Thus, the human rights movement
pursues a reformist programme based on
rectifying legislation and practice to become
more humane and consistent with international
human rights norms and basic liberties.
There has been an ongoing, longstanding debate,
not only among rights advocates in Egypt, but all
over the world, about the relationship between
democracy as a political system and the
acquisition of human rights and basic liberties
more broadly. Numerous rights and liberties,
such as freedom of opinion and expression and
the right to representation and participation
require a democratic system to flourish. Yet, the
human rights movement in Egypt sought to
create a political environment favourable to
guarantees for human rights and basic liberties,
regardless of the type of political system.
Even in times of heightened antagonism between
rights groups and the state, these organisations
never refused a government invitation to the table
to talk. As such, rights groups are not assumed to
engage in revolutionary activism, but largely in
reforming the instruments, strategies and tools of
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the existing regime in order to promote human
rights.
Yet, the question of the relationship between
human rights organisations and the revolution is
far more complex if approached from the
perspective of human rights organisations’
outreach, presence on the street, and their
ability to mobilise. It is perhaps this ability, or
lack of it, that prevents rights groups from
engaging in any sort of mass activism, a situation
that has been compounded by several factors, as
discussed below.
2 Legal and security restrictions
Legal restrictions on all civic and political
forums, from parties and labour syndicates to
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
human rights organisations, have served to
isolate and insulate these forums from the street.
The authorities used all means possible to limit
any genuine role for these institutions, placing for
example, severe restrictions on registration and
licensing. The Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights (EOHR), for example, operated ‘under
construction’ for 15 years before finally receiving
a licence as a civic association. Human rights
organisations were severely hampered from
registering as NGOs by the substantial flaws in
the various NGO laws; from Law 32/1964 to Law
153/1999, which was declared unconstitutional,
and finally to Law 84/2002. All of these laws put
NGOs under the heavy hand of the law and the
Ministry of Social Affairs, preventing them from
genuine, effective action. These laws prompted
organisations to find other legal frameworks
under which to pursue their activities, such as
non-profit civil companies subject to the civil
code, as is the case with the Cairo Institute for
Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), legal firms, like
the Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC) or
research or academic firms; others were
established as publication centres. This greatly
weakened the social presence of these
organisations, and in any case, these
arrangements became illegal under Law 84/2002
on associations and private institutions.
Another significant drawback to these legal
restrictions was that it fostered a tendency of
rights groups to eschew the idea of membership-
based civic association. The leadership of these
groups was well aware of the experience of the
Tunisian Human Rights League: the Tunisian
authorities intentionally planted its own
personnel among the league’s membership, later
allowing them to take control of the general
assembly.
Thus, rights organisations tended to establish either
non-profit companies or private institutions
regulated by the NGO law. Even those organisations
that were registered as civic associations set strict
conditions for membership or thought twice about
accepting new members. The best example is the
EOHR, the oldest rights group in Egypt after the
Arab Organization for Human Rights: the EOHR
has a membership of 3,000 while 7,000 prospective
members are waiting for approval, some having
applied for membership years ago. This wariness of
security infiltration denied rights organisations the
opportunity to attract supporters and members
from all segments of society and, hence, cost them
an effective entryway to society and social
involvement. Most organisations have limited their
circles to the political, social and cultural elite.
3 Human rights organisations – the crisis of elitism
From the late 1980s, the human rights
movement adopted the public relations
mechanisms common to the global human rights
movement, including the following:
1 Campaigns, which select a specific issue or
phenomenon for intensive activities of various
types over a specific time period with the goal
of achieving objectives deemed realisable by
the campaign organisers. One of the most
prominent examples is the EOHR campaign
in the early 1990s to end torture, which
managed to put the issue on the agenda of the
People’s Assembly after several MPs filed
official questions about the issue. 
2 Press engagements including urgent appeals
that contain the institution’s stance on a
particular incident in order to inform the
global public opinion. 
3 Human rights reports that address a
particular phenomenon such as torture and ill
treatment in prisons or police stations. 
4 Annual reports and activity reports. 
5 Periodicals and journals (Hasan 2007).
Of all the public relations instruments that
human rights organisations use to reach their
audience, the publication is easiest but also the
narrowest. The vast majority of rights groups
issue numerous publications, most of them of
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good quality in terms of form and content, yet it
is very difficult to gauge the impact of these
various publications, but the general impression
is that they rarely reach an audience thirsty for
the knowledge they contain. More likely, the
public, even the educated public, does not
willingly read most of them, and rarely does any
rights organisation, like any civil society
institution or indeed government institution,
receive a marked public response to these
publications. Indeed, it is doubtful that they are
closely read even by the narrow educated elite
class, let alone the general public.
Certainly, many individuals read these
publications motivated by different concerns,
among them students, lawyers or others in the
legal profession. Some members of the general
public may read an educational pamphlet with
some degree of interest or avidity when the
pamphlet might help solve a personal problem.
But the real response to publications by advocacy
groups is extremely low compared to the effort
and financial resources devoted to them (al Sayyid
Sa’id 2004).
The lack of public enthusiasm and interest in
these publications, despite the wealth of content
they contain, can be attributed to two factors.
First, the style and language used in them is of
the dry academic type and not addressed at the
general public or the person on the street.
Second, these publications are produced in full
by projects funded by various donors. This means
that the rights organisations cannot sell them,
but only distribute them free by mail or in
person. This deprives these publications of a
fundamental part of their value as a means of
communication with society, particularly since
rights groups share largely similar mailing lists.
One person may receive dozens of publications,
which deters him from reading them unless a
topic grabs him. In turn, despite their
importance, the reach of publications is limited
to a closed circle of the educated elite in Egypt.
The same observations apply to intellectual
forums and cultural seminars organised by rights
groups, which are largely limited to a select
group of attendees invited by e-mail, regular
mail or hand-delivered invitation. Normally,
these events do not have a large audience, only a
few dozen in the best of cases (although events
focused on political Islam or Palestine may be
well attended). These organisations do not
normally organise mass activities, for two
reasons: first, security harassment, which deters
these sorts of activities and second, doubts that
the issues are of interest to a wider audience.
The HMLC pursued another tack by embracing
several popular, protest and labour movements,
which gave the centre a presence among these
movements. The centre also volunteered to
defend any person detained or arrested in
connection with labour or popular protests, which
boosted the centre’s credibility in these circles.2
Legal aid and the receipt of complaints is the
most popular and socially effective tactic, as
rights organisations’ relationship with society is
partly based on common interests. Thus, the
groups that document, monitor and collect
complaints are the most connected with society.
The EOHR and the HMLC receive the most
complaints, which have increased enormously
since the revolution.
With the spread of social media networks before
and after the revolution, most of these
organisations also established pages on Facebook
and Twitter to connect with the public, yet, the
number of participants in these pages is still
quite small compared to their peers in other
countries such as Palestine.
4 Crisis of trust between rights organisations
and society
Although the state’s media apparatus, comprised
largely of newspapers and television channels,
failed abysmally to convince the public of its
policies or even of its credibility, when it comes to
human rights organisations, the state succeeded
in building a firm barrier between these groups
and the public. The state media apparatus
successfully impugned the reputation of these
groups for being recipients of foreign funding by
accusing them of implementing foreign, Western
agendas that target the state’s sovereign
decision-making authority. The state laid severe
legal conditions on their ability to access foreign
funding, evidenced in an order of the Military
Governor, which required permission from the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to
receive such funds. This legal restriction has
brought NGOs, and especially groups working in
human rights, to a dead end and increased their
dependence on non-approved foreign funding.
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SCAF then attempted to pressure foreign donors
themselves, while also launching vicious
campaigns against groups that received such
funding, taking legal action against some. These
smear campaigns have generally been met with
positive responses among several sectors of
society; however, they tend to be elite corps within
civil society rather than the public more generally.
Perhaps a new tendency on the part of several
organisations to hold their training sessions and
seminars in five-star hotels and tourist resorts
has only stoked suspicions about foreign funding
and therefore increased these organisations’
isolation from the broader society.
5 Political stagnation and the generational crisis
within rights organisations
As most rights organisations have chosen to take
the form of companies, they have become
personalised organisations, known more for the
name of their founder than for the association’s
name or specialisation. The rotation of power
within these organisations is extremely limited,
which has fostered political stagnation. Advocacy
groups are divided into two major parts. The first
comprises the founders, who have become public
figures invited to public and private, local and
foreign activities and who are prominent on
television screens and the pages of private
newspapers, both independent and opposition.
The second part comprises the staff of these
organisations, who shoulder the brunt of the work
for the organisations’ activities and projects,
although most of them do not share the limelight.
Usually, the average salary of the staff pales in
comparison to the relatively large salaries of the
director or founder of the organisation in his
capacity as project director or director of most or
all of the institution’s projects.
Any political conflict within the organisation or
attempts by the second generation to advance
usually takes one of two routes: either the
subordinate accepts the dictates and convictions
of the director or founder, or s/he leaves the
organisation and establishes an independent
group. This choice has become a refuge for
numerous activists, who have spontaneously
moved from the ranks of unknown staff to the
class of founder and director, especially given the
haphazardness with which some donors parcel
out large grants, without due consideration for
the history, experience and ability of the
organisation, not only to administer and
implement its activities, but to manage the grant
funds themselves. Indeed, these organisations
have attracted many figures who have no
connection to the human rights movement.
The primary factor in the success of these
organisations is grant-proposal writing and the
skilful management of relations with donors.
Thus, human rights groups have seen waves of
new entrants, most prominently before the
parliamentary elections of 2005, when several
new organisations emerged, many of them
involved in election monitoring and training
projects. The most recent wave came after the
revolution, when the second and even third
generation of young people who previously
worked with these organisations established their
own groups. Others were attracted to the field by
the announcement of increased funding
opportunities for political awareness-raising.
This state of affairs has created a distorted
human rights community, where continuity and
survival is not grounded in the society for which
they ostensibly work and where social or popular
acceptance or social incorporation is not a factor
for continuity. Many of these organisations were
founded far from the street and society, and their
ability to obtain funding is the principal
determinant of their continuity and success.
These reasons, in whole or in part, have deprived
human rights groups of an active street presence
and their ability to act as mass-based
organisations that engage in political and social
activism, capable of influencing the masses and
the larger society.
5.1 Elitist activism vs street activism
One of the major contradictions we have
witnessed in Egyptian public life in recent years is
the great disconnect between all civil and
political organisations and the wave of systematic
yet spontaneous protests that erupted. These
protests exposed that neither the political parties
nor civil society organisations could claim real
leadership of the people – and this became
evident in the first days of the revolution. Despite
the fact that these protests could have provided
fertile ground for civil society organisations or
political parties to form a populist constituency,
they never really made a genuine effort to engage
with the actors or the events. The involvement of
human rights organisations was limited to issuing
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a rights statement or sending an investigations
commission at the most. Human rights
organisations never sought to establish coalitions
with labour or syndicate movements, and the
notion of collective action remained poor; they
worked as separate islands suffering from overlap
in their activities and lack of outreach.
No doubt, rights organisations were not at the
centre of events when the revolution erupted. Yet
to be fair, rights groups did create awareness
within society of human rights issues and make
them into matters of public opinion. They have
defined the minimum threshold of rights.
Indeed, many media and cultural figures
attribute the January revolution to two primary
issues. The first is the case of Khaled Said, which
is at root a human rights issue, and the case was
made public thanks to rights organisations,
which also publicised several other issues that
would have been covered up in the past, whether
due to fear of security or in the context of a deal
with the security apparatus. Humiliating
treatment by the security forces was no longer
acceptable to many citizens who were more
informed and understood the basic threshold of
their rights. Claims based on rights followed by
litigation before the courts or complaints with
human rights organisations became a familiar
threat used by victims in police stations and
detention facilities. The second is the case of
wide-scale rigging that took place in the 2010
parliamentary elections and which human rights
organisations played a critical role in
documenting and exposing.
The nature of human rights abuses and basic
liberties were clearly demarcated, and some
Egyptian films began addressing these themes,
seen particularly in the films of late director ‘Atif
al-Tayyib, such as al-Bari’ (‘The Innocent’) and
Didd al-Hukuma (‘Against the Government’).
These generated a cumulative, collective
awareness of human rights concepts, standards
and values, and human rights issues became
public opinion issues.
If rights groups were not successful in reaching
the Egyptian street, they did reach intermediary
groups, most importantly a distinguished group
of lawyers, journalists and researchers, who acted
as conduits between these groups and society.
These intermediaries, who had benefited from
various training programmes, used human rights
terms and concepts in defence arguments before
the courts and made them a principal standard
by which to assess government policies in the
media. In addition, the new generation of web
users and bloggers connected to social media
sites such as Facebook and Twitter were well-
versed in human rights, and they were extremely
active in documenting human rights abuses,
particularly on their personal web-pages or blogs.
Blogger Wael Abbas was the first to post a video
of torture in a police station on his blog, al-Wa’i
al-Masri.
Although for the reasons explained above, rights
groups are accused of elitism and are largely
limited to a small circle of highly educated,
conscious people, the first sparks of the
revolution came from precisely this social class,
which comprised members of social network
sites, bloggers and students at Egyptian and
foreign universities, who are one of the prime
target groups for rights organisations.
Thus, although rights groups were unable to play
a leading role in the revolution, given their very
limited street capacities, over many years of
struggle and work, they did contribute, among
many other actors, in cultivating a social
consciousness of rights and liberties, which in
turn fostered a cognitive dissonance between
rights and liberties as they should exist and the
painful reality. This conflict ultimately exploded
in the form of the Egyptian revolution. Thus, one
can consider rights groups as playing a role in
relation to the revolution, but only indirectly.
Many issues, particularly the issue of torture,
became a matter of public concern, and the
unacceptability of torture in prisons and police
stations was built into the social consciousness.
Torture then became a reason to demonstrate or
protest. Indeed, in some villages and
communities, torture prompted the storming of
police stations and the targeting of police
personnel. This is in addition to socioeconomic
issues, such as a minimum wage, which also
became a primary demand of the revolution.
The most important role of rights organisations
in the revolution was their documentation of
human rights violations during the revolution,
their appeals to international human rights
organisations and the focus on a rights-based
perspective in the media coverage of events.
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6 Eruption of the revolution and the role of
rights organisations
Rights organisations engaged with the revolution
in three major spheres. First, they formed fact-
finding commissions and anti-corruption
committees, a tack pursued by the EOHR. On
3 February, several representatives of civil society
groups and human rights activities met in the
offices of the EOHR to discuss the current
situation and consider appropriate means to
support the demonstrators and their demands,
and hold to account all those responsible for the
abuses since the January 25th demonstrations.
These individuals and groups then formed the
Egyptian Fact-Finding and Anti-Corruption
Commission.3
The fact-finding commission assumed the task of
observing and documenting these abuses, and
identifying the persons responsible, so that all
measures could be taken to hold them accountable
for their crimes. The commission also contacted
the International Red Cross to arrange for food
and medicine for the besieged demonstrators.
In addition to the commission’s actions, the
EOHR documented some 1,000 casualties of the
revolution, including the injured and the dead.
But these efforts were not published in a report
or even online; rather the EOHR issued a press
statement carrying only five or six testimonies as
an example.
In reaction, civilians began being referred to
military courts (up to 12,000 as of August 2011)
on various charges and most were convicted – a
flagrant violation of the right to a fair trial and,
insofar as military courts are exceptional courts
for the prosecution of military personnel,
inconsistent with international human rights
charters. The EOHR issued a report entitled
‘Military Courts: The Infringement of Guarantees
for a Fair Trial’, to document cases of civilians
referred to military courts after the revolution.
Moreover, human rights organisations in
conjunction with the CIHRS issued a document
setting out a number of principles designed to
guarantee that the Egyptian constitution will be
based on the values of the January 25th
revolution and its most prominent slogan:
‘Freedom, Dignity, Social Justice’. The principles
set out in six detailed articles are based on the
sovereignty of the people as the source of all
authority, and the document was signed by more
than 25 rights organisations.
The document of these principles was called a
‘papyrus’, in appreciation of ancient Egyptian
civilisation and the great cultural heritage of
cultural, social, ethnic and religious diversity
that has shaped Egyptians’ character and
identity. The productive interplay of Pharaonic,
Nubian, Coptic, Arabic and Islamic civilisations
constitutes a source of pride and respect for all
Egyptians, the origin of Egyptian particularity,
and the backbone of their sacred national union.
Based on a recognition of this diversity and
pluralism, the papyrus advocates the need for
the constitution to recognise numerous sources
of legislation as a supra-constitutional principle
that reflects Egyptians’ religious, confessional,
ethnic and cultural diversity. Egyptian identity
cannot be reduced to one dimension without
destroying Egyptians’ national union.
The papyrus refrains from elaborating in detail
the rights to be enshrined in the constitution and
legislation, choosing instead to emphasise that
international human rights conventions should
constitute the supreme reference point for the
elaboration of these rights. The papyrus
proposed to immunise these rights against any
infringement based on ostensible ‘democratic’
pretexts that claim majority backing through the
formation of a Constitutional Council to oversee
this task, composed of the heads of the high
courts and chaired by the president of the
Supreme Judicial Council. Nor did the papyrus
propose a particular system of governance
(parliamentary, presidential or mixed), but
rather leaves this to the constitution. It simply
advanced a set of supreme constitutional
provisions that must be respected in any
democratic system, regardless of the specific
mode of governance adopted by the constitution.
Another major arena of human rights activism,
represented by the HMLC4 and the ECESR
(Egyptian Center for Economic and Social
Rights), might be called support for the revolution
and the revolutionaries. From the first day of the
revolution, the HMLC played a vital role, forming
part of the field hospital and making the centre a
locus of consultation, action and security plans,
and a meeting point for popular and labour
leaders. As a result, on 3 February, members of
the military police surrounded 1 Tawfiqiya Market
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Street, the building where the HMLC offices are
located and also home to the ECESR. Some 70
thugs surrounded the building as well, chanting
‘traitors and collaborators’, after which the
military police entered and searched the offices of
both organisations. At the time, the HMLC was
being used as an operations room for the Front to
Defend Egyptian Demonstrators, which included
both activists with the centre as well as several
volunteer lawyers and researchers. Many activists
with the centre were in Tahrir Square helping to
document violations by the Egyptian authorities.
Several staff members of both the HMLC and the
ECESR were arrested, including Ahmad Sayf al-
Islam Hamad, a lawyer with the HMLC; lawyer
Mustafa al-Hasan Taha; Muhsin Bashir, an attorney
with the HMLC; Muna al-Misri, a researcher with
the HMLC; Fatima ‘Ibada; Sa’id Hadadi, a
researcher with Amnesty International; and Daniel
Williams, a researcher with Human Rights Watch.
The HMLC has taken on several cases. On
14 March 2011, it sued for the dissolution of the
State Security Investigations apparatus (SSI) and
the conversion of its offices into museums under
the Ministry of Culture in memory of the
revolution. It also adopted the cause of the
political activists in solidarity with events at the
Two Saints Church (see Ali, this IDS Bulletin), as
well as issuing numerous legal studies on
constitutional amendments and military trials.
These spheres of activism described above have
represented the primary strategic focuses for
rights organisations since the eruption of the
revolution. Yet, these activities and those of many
other organisations have reflected a fundamental
confusion between politics and advocacy. The
reference point for post-revolutionary action on
the part of several organisations was political
rather than legal or rights based. In addition, at
the beginning of the revolution, several
organisations announced they would form a
political party, although they later retracted this.
Rights centres hosting protest groups and
meetings, despite the nobility of the idea, also
walk the line between politics and advocacy.
Since the US administration announced that it
would give $40 million in support of civil society
organisations, a new crisis of foreign funding
looms on the horizon, particularly for rights
groups. It is clear that Egyptian society is deeply
ambivalent in principle about the idea of foreign
funding, despite the noble objectives that will be
advanced by the funds. The problem is
compounded by a lack of transparency in the
budgets of advocacy groups and the fact that the
vast majority do not declare their budgets or
their sources of funding. This has put rights
groups back at square one after the gains made
during the revolution.
7 Conclusion: the future of rights groups
post revolution
The January 25th revolution exposed the crisis of
disconnect between the rights groups and the
street. These organisations had long been
constrained by legal and security interference,
which isolated them and limited their activism
and outreach. Many organisations refused to
register as member-based associations, and even
those that did, set strict conditions for
membership, rejecting or freezing many
membership applications. Except in rare cases,
they were prisoners in their Cairo offices. Thus,
for rights groups to play a pioneering role in
lobbying for progressive social and political
change in Egypt, they must take action on the
following fronts:
1 Resolve the problem of foreign funding by working
on several levels. First, they must initiate a
transparent, open dialogue with political and
social forces on foreign funding and available
alternatives. Second, they must be transparent
about foreign funding by declaring all the
grants they receive and releasing their annual
budgets to the official press. Third, they must
look for alternatives to foreign funding by
activating membership, collecting membership
dues and approaching businessmen for grants
following the relaxation of security’s grip over
these groups. Fourth, they must promote and
disseminate a culture of volunteerism in
society in order to minimize the cost of
projects and programmes they sponsor. They
will be helped in this by the fact that the
revolution has created a huge momentum for
volunteerism and participation, particularly
among youth. Thus, attracting volunteers is no
longer as difficult as it was in the past. The
difficulty now is administering a clear, defined
programme to manage volunteers and get the
most out of them without losing them or their
enthusiasm. Perhaps the formation of a
volunteer network could act as the nucleus to
increase the popular reach of these groups.
El Naggar Human Rights Organisations and the Egyptian Revolution 84
2 Adopt a strategy for popular expansion and outreach
through mass activities based on raising
awareness of human rights values and
concepts and familiarising citizens with their
rights and duties. These activities should
extend outside the capital to peripheral cities,
and organisations should engage with citizens’
demands and defend their rights through work
units in the field and legal aid departments,
which may rely on a group of volunteer lawyers
trained in the application of international
human rights instruments in local courts. The
attorneys could be compensated with thank-
you letters or their names published in the
association’s publications, or they could be
honoured in ceremonies attended by a select
political and social elite or given nominal
remuneration. These types of actions will help
integrate groups into society through common
interests and by nurturing a strong sense among
citizens of the importance of human rights
groups and their centrality to society, so that
society itself becomes the first line of defence
against any blatant security interventions or
infringement on their presence or activities.
The primary source of power of the EOHR
remains the fact that it receives complaints and
maintains a legal aid unit. It receives thousands
of complaints every year, thus establishing a
broad community of beneficiaries.
3 Creating and strengthening cross-cutting collective
work: rights organisations must not only speak
among themselves but extend their outreach
to other civil society actors such as:
z development associations who have a broad
popular base;
z professional syndicates, with their
substantial political weight in society;
z youth centres, given that young people
currently act as the engine of events and
protests in Egypt.
Such coordination could pull the rights
movement out of its isolation and open it to
all classes and social groups. For this strategy
to succeed, organisations must be fully
convinced of the importance of participation,
they must function like peers and equals and
not assume that they can instrumentalise the
relationship with other organisations for their
own purposes. Moreover, the stances taken by
civil society will be stronger if they issue from
a larger, more diverse, popular base.
4 Bring in the youth: the January 25th revolution
revealed the latent energy of Egyptian youth,
which can no longer be ignored. Rights
organisations must adopt a strategy to involve
young people in advocacy work and rely on
them directly as messengers of human rights,
ideas and values. This cannot be done without
opening institutional channels within
organisations to allow young people to ascend
to senior positions.
5 Take note of the mix of advocacy, partisanship and
politics: many leaders and staff at human rights
organisations have political commitments and
loyalties. They will thus face a challenge in the
coming phase, regarding the stance of rights
groups on human rights violations. Many
political forces fear that religious movements
will dominate Egyptian politics, which has led
some of them to turn a blind eye to human
rights abuses by the military, focusing instead
on the actions and stances of Islamist forces,
especially since some opposition figures have
entered the government and these figures are
colleagues of media workers and civil society
leaders. Rights groups must thus take care to
draw a line between themselves and the state,
in whatever guise and whoever represents it,
so that they are able to preserve their critical
stance on human rights violations regardless
of their source.5
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Notes
1 Interview with Hafiz Abu Sa’da, Secretary-
General of the Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights, for this article (2011).
2 Ahmad Sayf al-Islam Hamad, Director of
HMLC, in an interview for this article (2011).
3 First statement of the Fact-Finding and Anti-
Corruption Commission; 4 February 2011.
4 HMLC is an Egyptian human rights advocacy
centre that focuses on litigation, campaigns
and legal research inside Egypt. Established in
1999 as a law firm subject to the Egyptian bar
law, the centre has branches in Cairo and
Aswan. As many of the staff tend to the left of
the political spectrum, the centre is known for
embracing popular and protest movements,
particularly labour protests, for the legal aid
given to prisoners and detainees of conscience.
5 Ahmad Sayf al-Islam Hamad, Director of
HMLC, in an interview for this article (2011).
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